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To assess risk for human exposure to avian inﬂ  uenza 
viruses (AIV), we sampled California wild birds and ma-
rine mammals during October 2005–August 2007and es-
timated human–wildlife contact. Waterfowl hunters were 8 
times more likely to have contact with AIV-infected wildlife 
than were persons with casual or occupational exposures 
(p<0.0001). 
T
he emergence of highly pathogenic avian inﬂ  uenza 
virus (AIV) (H5N1) in domestic poultry in Asia with 
spillover infections in humans has raised concerns about 
the potential for a human pandemic (1). Although subtype 
H5N1 is the most well-known infecting strain, evidence of 
direct bird-to-human transmission has been documented 
for several other AIV subtypes (2). 
Little is known about the types of exposure that re-
sult in human infections, especially with AIV being trans-
mitted from wild birds and animals because only a few 
cases of transmission to humans have been documented 
(3–5). Overall, the types of exposures associated with 
the transmission of AIV to humans have been ingestion, 
inhalation of aerosolized virus, or direct contact through 
mucous membranes (2,4). The probability of infection with 
AIV varies with the activity and depends on the contact 
type (duration and route) and dose. Contacts for the gen-
eral public are likely short and indirect, often occurring 
through outdoor activities, such as hiking, picnicking, or 
feeding birds. Contact for waterfowl hunters is especially 
intense and direct during bird-cleaning activities. Biolo-
gists and workers at wildlife hospitals have frequent and 
direct contact with wild birds and mammals. Biologists trap 
apparently healthy free-ranging animals and perform ﬁ  eld 
necropsies, and rehabilitation workers handle sick and in-
jured wild animals. In this study, we tested wild birds and 
marine mammals for AIV to determine the exposure risks 
associated with speciﬁ  c casual, recreational, and occupa-
tional activities that result in contact with wildlife.
The Study
Human risk categories were created based on a typical 
contact type with wildlife: 1) casual (the general public), 
2) recreational (waterfowl hunters), and 3) occupational 
(wildlife biologists, wildlife hospital workers, and vet-
erinarians). Frequency of contact with AIV was estimated 
for each risk group by evaluating the prevalence of AIV 
among animals sampled opportunistically in each category. 
Surveillance for AIV was conducted from October 2005 
through August 2007. 
For casual contact, wild bird species (mostly periur-
ban passerines such as sparrows, ﬁ  nches, and crows) were 
sampled to reﬂ  ect typical daily exposures for the public 
(Figure). For recreational contact, birds were assessed by 
sampling hunter-killed waterfowl (mostly mallards, north-
ern shovelers, gadwalls, green-winged teals, northern 
pintails, and American widgeons) at check stations in the 
Sacramento National Wildlife Refuge. For occupational 
contact, wild birds (seabirds, wading birds, waterfowl, 
raptors, and passerines) and marine mammals (seals and 
sea lions) admitted to 3 northern California wildlife hospi-
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Figure. Map of California displaying sample collection sites for 
avian inﬂ  uenza testing, fall 2005–summer 2007. The casual risk 
category is represented by a square, recreational risk category 
by a star, and occupational risk category by a circle. Counties are 
abbreviated as follows: CC, Contra Costa; GLE, Glenn; KER, Kern; 
LA, Los Angeles; MRN, Marin; ORA, Orange; RIV, Riverside; SAC, 
Sacramento; SOL, Solano; YOL, Yolo.tals were sampled. Cloacal samples were taken from birds 
and nasal and rectal samples from marine mammals with 
rayon-tipped swabs (MicroPur; PurFybr, Inc., Munster, IN, 
USA). Birds in recovery also had oropharyngeal samples 
taken. Swab samples were placed in viral transport media, 
transported within 24 hours from the site of collection to 
the University of California, Davis, in a cooler with ice 
packs and then transferred to a –70°C freezer for storage. A 
total of 9,157 samples were tested for AIV. Of these, 2,346 
were screened by virus isolation in embryonating chicken 
eggs (6,7), and 6,811 were screened by real-time reverse 
transcription–PCR (RT-PCR) (7). All positive samples 
were tested for Eurasian H5 viruses (8).
The prevalence of AIV in each group was low (range 
0.1%–0.9%) (Table), and no samples were positive for Eur-
asian H5. We found that risk of contact with AIV-infect-
ed wildlife was 8 times higher for the recreational group 
compared to either the occupational or the casual group 
(p<0.0001; EpiInfo, Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention, Atlanta, GA, USA).
Conclusions
We did not detect AIV (H5N1) in California during Oc-
tober 2005–August 2007 nor did other surveillance efforts 
in the United States (9). We did detect other AIVs, although 
at a low prevalence (<1%). The prevalence of AIV in Cali-
fornia wildlife was substantially lower than the prevalence 
reported in Alaskan wildlife in the same ﬂ  yway (10). AIV 
prevalence may decrease with latitude (11), or this opportu-
nistic sample design may have resulted in testing of species 
with a natural low prevalence. Although overall prevalence 
was low, it was highest in the recreational category and, 
coupled with the directness and intensity of the contacts es-
pecially during bird cleaning, this group would be expected 
to have the highest risk for infection. However, emergence 
or introduction of a virus that causes disease in wild birds 
or animals would likely result in a disproportional shift in 
prevalence of infection in wildlife brought to rehabilitation 
hospitals, thus making occupational contact more risky. As 
a recent example, 1 stork and 2 buzzards that were infected 
with AIV (H5N1) were brought to a wildlife hospital in 
Poland, which potentially exposed staff (12).
Novel transmission pathways are possible in places 
like wildlife hospitals because wild species that do not meet 
in nature are brought into close and extended contact with 
each other and humans. For example, marine mammals are 
susceptible to infection with AIV (4) and human inﬂ  uenza 
viruses (13) and have been documented as intermediate 
hosts (4). Other species may also be intermediate hosts for 
AIV, although they have not been identiﬁ  ed. Those work-
ing in wildlife occupations should be encouraged to wear 
personal protective equipment when handling wildlife be-
cause of the types of contacts they can have and the poten-
tial for viruses to emerge in this setting. Similarly, personal 
protection should be recommended for waterfowl hunters 
because of the relatively higher prevalence of AIV in the 
birds with which they have contact.
We assessed the risk for human exposure to AIV by 
opportunistically sampling wildlife at the human–wild ani-
mal interface. A better measure of human risk would be to 
directly assess human exposure by testing for antibodies to 
all AIV subtypes that could occur in nature. Although it is 
not practical to simultaneously test for 144 virus subtypes, 
2 serologic studies of persons exposed to wildlife showed 
antibodies to a limited number of AIVs (3,14). Since these 
exposures did not cause discernable illness, diagnosis based 
on clinical signs would likely underestimate infection.
Although our methods enabled us to compare exposure 
risk among different groups, the testing methods we used 
likely did not estimate the true AIV prevalence in wildlife. 
The real-time RT-PCR used in this study and in national 
surveillance efforts (7) has not been validated in wildlife 
(10), nor has virus isolation in embryonating chicken eggs, 
and it may be that neither method is perfect in detecting 
AIV in species that are only distantly related to chickens 
(15). Improved diagnostic methods are needed to assess 
AIV infections in wildlife species, and close monitoring 
of persons with the highest level of exposure to AIV is a 
necessary component of an early warning system to detect 
transmission from animals to humans. 
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Table. Prevalence of avian influenza viruses in California wild birds and marine mammals, October 2005–August 2007, categorized by 
exposure risk category 
Exposure risk group  No. positive (%)  No. tested  Species (no. positive) 
Casual 8 (0.2)  4,757 Finch (3), sparrow (2), cowbird (1), quail (2) 
Recreational 20 (0.9)  2,346 Duck (19), goose (1) 
Occupational 2 (0.1)  2,054 Seabird (1), egret (1) 
Total 30 (0.3) 9,157Avian Inﬂ  uenza Virus Exposure
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